Thoughts on United States Citizenship

 

What is citizenship?

For all intents and purposes, citizenship can be defined as membership in a sociopolitical community. Citizens are members of the society in which they choose to reside and establish an economic, political, and familial foundation. Being a citizen of a country involves offering and demonstrating allegiance to the sovereign or government of that country and equally receiving protection from that sovereign or government in return. In free societies, it also involves participating and being represented in legislative processes and having a financial stake in local and national markets.

Since our founding, the United States has recognized the inherent right of choosing to become a citizen of that society which best resembles our individual principles and ideals. In recognizing this, our government also understood that each individual can choose to leave the society into which they were born. No state has the right to force an individual into perpetual allegiance. And in identifying the natural right of sovereignty between governments and of the natural rights of individuals, the publicists, legal scholars, and statesmen of the founding generation understood that no foreigner can become a member of a nation without that nation’s consent. Our laws of citizenship and naturalization were created precisely to reflect these basic principles.

In the United States today, the federal government grants citizenship to anyone born in our country, unless they are the children of foreign diplomats on official government business. The problems that are created by this method of conferring citizenship extend to all aspects of modern society. Some of the more pressing issues involve dual and “birthright” citizenship. To understand the difficulties created by dual and birthright citizenship, we must first comprehend the foundation of our laws and how they were established.

The Declaration of Independence did two things: It declared to the world that the British colonies would become free and independent states, absolving themselves from the control and jurisdiction of the British crown, and it also established basic principles and rights of free people to set up a proper government for the protection of those unalienable rights. By creating and signing the Declaration of Independence, our Founding Fathers explicitly rejected monarchy and those laws which are ancillary to that form of government. Monarchies are governed by feudal principles and the laws of citizenship under the British crown were consequently based on them.

Feudal citizenship was supported by the notion that everyone born in a given territory owes their allegiance to the ruler of said territory and is therefore a subject of the ruling crown at birth, regardless of the nationality and allegiance of the parents. Feudal citizenship was a strict interpretation of jus soli, or “right of the soil.” In the British monarchy, it was jus soli that determined British citizenship and the notion of perpetual allegiance to the king.

However, feudal laws were rejected by our Founders who fought to rescind the monarchical system during the American Revolution. When the Founders subsequently established a republican form of government, drafted our Constitution, and created our first naturalization laws, it was clear that jus soli citizenship according to feudal principles was not to be a staple of American government.

One of the early court cases dealing with conflicting governments and allegiance was Respublica v. Chapman in 1781. In the opinion of the court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that by the act of declaring independence and revolting against the British crown, Pennsylvania rejected English common law and statutes. At the time of the Revolution, the common law of England concerning citizenship was aptly defined by the English jurist, Sir William Blackstone.

“Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the crown of England, that is, within the ligeance, or as it is generally called, the allegiance of the king; and aliens, such as are born out of it….Under the feodal system, every owner of lands held them in subjection to some superior or lord, from whom or whose ancestors the tenant or vasal had received them: and there was mutual trust or confidence subsisting between the lord and vasal, that the lord should protect the vasal in the enjoyment of the territory he had granted him, and, on the other hand, that the vasal should be faithful to the lord and defend him against all his enemies.” – Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769), Book I, Chapter 10

The differences between these views and that of the revolutionary generation in America are unmistakable. The government of the United States is that of the People. We owe protection to each other and to the Constitution, not one man serving in the capacity of an elected office. We do not live under the “subjection” to any “superior or lord.” We live as equals and give our consent to those whom we elect to perform duties in upholding the rule of law.

Blackstone continues with his definition:

“Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the king’s dominions immediately upon their birth….Natural allegiance is therefore a debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered, by any change of time, place, or circumstance, nor by any thing but the united concurrence of the legislature….For it is a principle of universal law, that the natural-born subject of one prince cannot by any act of his own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another, put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former: for this natural allegiance was intrinsic, and primitive, and antecedent to the other; and cannot be devested without the concurrent act of that prince to whom it was first due.”

Blackstone’s interpretation of English common law is accurate, but wholly incompatible with American citizenship, the language of our Declaration of Independence, and our Constitution. It contradicts the very foundation of republican government. The Founding Fathers certainly understood English common law and many of the words are indeed similar or the same. (After all, we do share the same language.) But the intent is absolutely different and in no way did the Founders adopt English common law as our own – especially when it concerned our national government’s form and function and the conferring of citizenship status, rights, and protections – all of which belong to the powers of government, derived from the People.

The right of expatriation is a part of the fundamental and individual right to choose one’s citizenship and is in direct opposition to English common law and Blackstone’s view. To expatriate means to renounce allegiance to one’s native country. The right to expatriate follows the same natural law principles that are used as the basis for becoming a member of the society that most closely represents one’s personal and political philosophies. It is predicated on the concept that citizenship follows the individual and it is up to the individual to decide what citizenship to acquire as an adult. It is a positive act of personal choice consistent with the philosophy that recognizes natural individual liberty.

Without the ability to expatriate, we are permanently subjected to the same sovereign or government – bound by the same allegiance and citizenship we acquired at birth. This again is a remnant of feudal society that was explicitly rejected during the American Revolution. The right to expatriate has always been recognized by the United States since its founding. In our Declaration of Independence, it was explicitly stated that the colonists had the right to “throw off” their previous government and to “dissolve the political bands,” or their allegiance, to it.

It was implicitly recognized afterward by our new government when we established naturalization laws allowing for foreigners to migrate to our country and to become citizens. The law required these foreigners to take an oath which legally dissolved their previous allegiance and affirmed their intent to become full citizens of the United States. There was no room for dual citizenship because the oath – the law – required them to forfeit all ties to their former sovereign or government. In 1873, the Congress even made a false oath a felony punishable by imprisonment, fines, or both.

By making the acquisition of citizenship a positive act of the individual and our government, the process implicitly identifies the natural right of our sovereign government to decide who shall be admitted as citizens. This right is reserved to the nation which will be conferring the new citizenship and cannot be decided by a foreign individual alone. This falls in line with the natural and international law theories that influenced our founding generation.

“He could not agree with the gentleman from Massachusetts, in the position, that a man cannot expatriate without the consent of his country. The practice of this country is a direct confutation of this doctrine; and it must be admitted, either that this country has trampled on the most solemn of social and national rights, by its practice, or that a man may leave his country and take on him the obligations of a new allegiance in this country. It seemed to him a position as conformable to sound morals as to political truth, that what a man has no right to offer, another man, or society, cannot rightfully accept. He would infer, that this country had a right to naturalize foreigners, because she has naturalized them; and that this country, by its laws, having accepted the allegiance of an alien, the alien had a right to offer that allegiance. The very proviso to naturalize an alien, without inquiry as to the consent of his own country having been previously obtained, seems to be predicated on the principle for which he contended – that a man has the right to expatriate himself without leave obtained, if he has not, all our laws of this sort, by which we convert an alien into a citizen completely, must be acknowledged to be a violation of the rights of nations.” – Representative Murray, House Annals, 3rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1028

Each naturalization act implicitly affirmed the right of expatriation. Beyond the implicitness of these acts, there are also instances of explicit congressional law and opinions by the highest legal authorities. Attorney General Black wrote the following opinion in 1859:

“The natural rights of every free person who owes no debts, and is not guilty of any crime, to leave the country of his birth, and in good faith, and for an honest purpose – the privilege of throwing off his natural allegiance, and substituting another allegiance in its place – the general right, in one word, to expatriation, is incontestable. I know that the common law of England denies it; that the judicial decisions of that country are opposed to it, and that some of our own Courts, misled by British authority, have expressed (though not very decisively) the same opinion. But all this is very far from settling the question.

“The Municipal Code of England is not one of the sources from which we derive our knowledge of international law. We take it from natural reason and justice, from writers of known wisdom, and from the practice of civilized nations. All these are opposed to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance. It is too injurious to the general interests of mankind to be tolerated. Justice denies that men should either be confined to their native soil, or driven away from it against their will. A man may either be exiled or imprisoned for an actual offence against the law of his country; but being born in it is not a crime for which either punishment can be justly inflicted. Among writers on public law the preponderance in weight of authority, as well as the majority in number, concur with Cicero, who declares that the right of expatriation is the firmest foundation of human freedom; and with Bynkershook, who utterly denies that the territory of a State is the prison of her people.” – Christian Ernst’s case, 9 Op. Atty-Genl. 356

This opinion refutes the idea that English common law is the foundation for United States citizenship laws. Seemingly not satisfied with the opinion from Attorney General Black, Congress later passed a law explicitly dealing with expatriation and natural rights, confirming that the right to expatriate was consistent with our national laws.

“Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensible to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness….

“Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government.” – An Act concerning the Rights of American Citizens in foreign States, July 27, 1868

This was a specific repudiation of English common law and it was an affirmation of the natural law principles that guided our national laws of citizenship. The right to expatriate has been continually expressed throughout or nation’s history both implicitly and explicitly by presidents, attorney generals, congressmen, judges, and publicists.

Seventy-five years after we declared independence from England, the distinction between the two governments was still correctly applied in the Supreme Court.

“It is true that most of the states have adopted the principles of English jurisprudence, so far as it concerns private and individual rights. And when such rights are in question, we habitually refer to the English decisions, not only with respect, but in many cases as authoritative. But in the distinction of political power between the great departments of government, there is such a wide difference between the power conferred on the President of the United States, and the authority and sovereignty which belong to the English crown, that it would be altogether unsafe to reason from any supposed resemblance between them, either as regards conquest in war, or any other subject where the rights and powers of the executive arm of the government are brought into question. Our Constitution and form of government must be our only guide.” – Fleming v. Page (1850), Opinion of the Supreme Court

Law dictionaries at the time also provide examples of what was understood to be the foundation of our laws and where they were derived.

“The common law of England is not in all respects to be taken as that of the United States, or of the several states; its general principles are adopted only so far as they are applicable to our situation.” – Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856), Law, Common. 4

Even scholars knew that English common law, in every respect, was not adopted at the time of the Revolution or anytime thereafter.

“The opinion is quite easily sustained by a reference to the British or common law doctrine of allegiance, which it is said we have inherited as a part of the common law of England. But there are two sufficient answers to this course of reasoning: the common law of England is not the international law of the world: and, we have inherited and adopted the common law of England only in so far as its provisions and its reasoning are adapted to our new situation and our political institutions.” – George Yeaman, Allegiance and Citizenship (1867), p. 36

These documents demonstrate that in different departments of our government it was implicit, and different legal practitioners and writers understood, that American law – concerning national, and particularly, citizenship laws – was not based on English common law. Many decades after our independence, it was still properly recognized by jurists, scholars, and our government that American law was the authority in deciding American matters. Citizenship in the United States was and is to be decided by the laws of the United States and no other.

If the United States government did not adopt English common law with regards to citizenship, then from where were our laws derived? We know that English common law was derived from feudal society. But American law was derived from natural law and reason.

“The law of nature is that which God, the sovereign of the universe, has prescribed to all men, not by any formal promulgation, but by the internal dictate of reason alone. It is discovered by a just consideration of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of human actions to the nature of man; and it comprehends all the duties which we owe either to the Supreme Being, to ourselves, or to our neighbors; as reverence to God, self-defence, temperance, honor to our parents, benevolence to all, a strict adherence to our engagements, gratitude, and the like.” – Bouvier’s, Law of Nature. 1

Natural law is based on nature’s principles that govern humanity in its natural state. As we exist in a natural state, there are immutable but unwritten laws that we live by and there is a moral good that we recognize as unique, universal, and perpetual to all mankind. It is from this natural existence and morality that we derive our concepts of individual liberty and rights.

The Swiss legal scholar and publicist, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, defined right as “a power, that man hath to make use of his liberty and strength in a particular manner, either in regard to himself, or in respect to other men, so far as this exercise of his strength and liberty is approved by reason.” (The Principles of Natural Law, Part I, Ch. 7)  These were called “unalienable” or “inherent” rights by our Founders and were the basis for our national government. It was this foundation that led Thomas Jefferson to declare, “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed….”

But as we can see, these publicly stated rights did not originate with our founding generation.

Natural law theories were passed down through writers and philosophers like Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and Samuel Pufendorf – all of whom developed their philosophies over a century prior to the American Revolution. With each generation, the natural law philosophies were adapted and improved and eventually applied to what we now call international laws. Hugo Grotius is considered by many to be the “father of international law,” but at the time of the American Revolution it was the Swiss legal expert, Emerich de Vattel, who influenced the minds of statesmen and philosophers of modern law.

These writers similarly expressed natural law and citizenship as being guided by the same principles. Prior to these natural law publicists, the French historian and jurist, Jean Bodin, laid out some groundwork for citizenship.

“The natural citizen is the free subject who is a native of the commonwealth, in that both, or one of his parents, was born there….” – Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576), Book I, Ch. 6

This can be assumed to be an early definition of what would later be called a “native-born” or “natural-born” citizen. But citizenship, according to Bodin, was not completed by birth alone. What made a citizen was “the submission and obedience of a free subject to his prince, and the tuition, protection, and jurisdiction exercised by the prince over his subject,” which was a distinct contrast of the relationship between a sovereign and foreigners or aliens.

The natural law theorists adopted this type of citizenship and used their principles of nature to define how citizenship is acquired and how it relates to different sovereignties or nations. According to these philosophers and scholars, it was the inherent right of the parents to confer their citizenship onto their children. It was the helplessness of the child that created the natural bond to the parents and consequently subjected them to the same laws of citizenship and the same political jurisdiction as their parents. In recognizing the laws of nature, it is understood that the citizenship of the minor child must follow that of the parents. To discount the citizenship of the parents and to confer citizenship on a child that differs from the parents is to deny the unalienable rights of the parents to maintain their natural influence over their children. It contradicts natural law to deny that right and instead to subject them to state influence, even – and especially – if it is not the country of the parents.

“The authority of parents over their children arises from two main causes: first, because the natural law itself, in commanding man to be social, enjoined upon parents the care of their children; and that this might not be neglected, Nature at the same time implanted in them the tenderest affection for their offspring. For the exercise of that care there is needed the power to direct the actions of children for their own welfare, which they do not yet understand themselves, owing to their lack of judgment.” – Samuel Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law (1673), Book II, Ch. 2

“Man, considered in his birth, is weakness and impotency itself; in regard as well to the body as to the soul. It is even remarkable, that the state of weakness and infancy lasts longer in man, than in any other animal. He is beset and pressed on all sides by a thousand wants, and destitute of knowledge, as well as strength, finds himself in an absolute incapacity of relieving them; He is therefore under a particular necessity of recurring to external assistance. Providence for this reason has inspired parents with that instinct or natural tenderness, which prompts them so eagerly to delight in the most troublesome cares for the preservation and good of those, whom they have brought into the world. It is likewise in consequence of this state of weakness and Ignorance, in which children are born, that they are naturally subject to their parents; whom nature has invested with all the authority and power necessary for governing those, whose advantage they are to study and procure.” – Burlamaqui: The Principles of Natural Law (1748), Part I, Ch. IV

A difference in citizenship between a parent and child could result in many irreconcilable conflicts in relation to the jurisdiction of the differing nations. Separating a parent and child against their will for no other reason than a child being born on a different piece of land than the one in which the parent owes a permanent allegiance is a violation of natural law. A minor has limited rights in the eyes of the state and is lawfully dependent on the parents. The state recognizes the inherent nature of a minor child to be incapable of choosing for himself the political jurisdiction of which he will become a member. For that reason, the state confers the same citizenship on the child as it does his naturalized parents at the time of naturalization. It also confers citizenship to the child of citizen parents when born outside its limits and jurisdiction. These follow the concept of jus sanguinis (“right of blood”) and both require the understanding that it is the right of the parents to determine for the child which nation will be his protector and which nation will receive his allegiance, until the child reaches the age of majority and can choose for himself.

To give a child a citizenship that differs from his parents does not only refute the concept of parental rights, but it also creates a conflict between two sovereigns and puts the family in a precarious position. What if the two nations became embroiled in war? Which sovereign would be the lawful protector of the parent and child? Which nation can seek restitution for their citizen if they should be injured? Should the nation, of which the child is a citizen, protect their citizen from his own loving parents? Is it lawful or even possible, according to the laws of nature, to do such a thing? Our reason would say that it is not.

As free people, we adopt governments and laws that govern only according to our consent. Citizenship is no different. We claim citizenship through our own consent and the consent of those members of a society in which we choose to become or remain a member. As sovereign nations do indeed exist, by natural right and by recognition from other nations, we do not have the right or ability as citizens of one nation to choose a citizenship of another without that nation’s consent. Conversely, we cannot be made a citizen of another nation without our consent. Children certainly cannot be made a citizen of any nation without the consent of their parents.

A child – theoretically – can only become a member of a society through his consent. But being that a child does not possess the ability to consent to citizenship, that consent resides naturally in the parents and citizenship is consequently passed to the child from the parents, not the state. This is jus sanguinis citizenship, which is consistent with natural law. If the parents wanted their child to be a citizen of a nation different from their own, they would naturalize in that nation and the nation would accept them as lawful citizens. To place their child in the hands of, and under the jurisdiction of a foreign state – thereby relinquishing their status as the child’s natural protector – is not only unreasonable and irresponsible but it is wholly inconsistent with natural law and ought to be firmly rejected.

Emerich de Vattel pieced all of these previous ideas together to form what would be the standard for national and international legal theory for several generations. His views of citizenship paralleled natural law theory and the jus sanguinis concept.

“I say, that, in order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for, if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country.” – Vattel: The Law of Nations (1758), Book I, Ch. XIX, § 212

“By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights (§ 212); the place of birth produces no change in this particular, and cannot, of itself, furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has given him.” – Ibid, § 215

This is the natural law that influenced statesmen of the American Revolution and the adoption of our Constitution. Vattel’s Law of Nations was a summation of natural law theory applied to national and international laws and customs. It was this philosophy and understanding that our Founders adopted and applied to a republican form of government. The subsequent laws that were passed in the ensuing decades were a direct result of those principles. Citizenship is under the jurisdiction of national law, and was heavily influenced by the publicists previously mentioned and particularly the perspective of Vattel, whose book had become widely known and read among the statesmen at the Constitutional Convention.

We can see the character of Vattel’s theories throughout the United States Constitution. As it applies to citizenship, a specific reference can be found in Article II, Section 1, which describes presidential eligibility requirements.

“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President…”

What other meaning of “natural born citizen” existed at the time that conformed to the principles of the newly created republican government and was commonly understood by the Founders? Quite reasonably, it is none other than Vattel’s definition:

“The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.” – Law of Nations, Book I, Ch. XIX, § 212

It cannot be reasonably argued that a definition based on feudal origins, extending from the laws of the British monarchy, applied to the new national laws of the United States. This is supported by the fact that our government has always recognized the right of expatriation since its inception. And contrary to the British form of government, the Vattel model is further supported by our early naturalization laws.

“That any alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof….And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond the sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States…” – Naturalization Act of March 26, 1790

Here we have two principles that contradict English common law and jus soli citizenship. By admitting new citizens into our society, it is made implicit that those persons can expatriate from their former nation, which is something the British monarchy rejected outright. By extending citizenship to children of citizen parents born on the soil of a foreign nation, it is implied that citizenship follows the jus sanguinis concept.

The principles of the Act of 1790 were reaffirmed in subsequent naturalization acts, albeit with minor modifications. The Naturalization Act of January 29, 1795 dropped the “natural born” phrase for children born abroad.

“…and the children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States…”

Subsequent acts of Congress reaffirmed that the laws of England did not apply to United States law. At no point did the government confer citizenship status to children of aliens born within the limits of this country. Only those children born to citizen parents, whether natural or naturalized, became citizens themselves. A review of naturalization laws since 1790 confirms that jus soli was never the exclusive condition that conferred citizenship on children in the United States and it was not the law concerning children born abroad to citizen parents.

Construction of law is critical in understanding its meaning and how it is to be applied. Our laws should be interpreted to reflect the intent of those who wrote them and the circumstances that necessitated their creation. Blackstone’s definition of a subject may not apply to our national law, but his take on construction is correct and applicable to any system of laws.

“The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and probable, and these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, or the spirit and reason of them all.” – Commentaries on the Laws of England, p. 59

Chief Justice John Marshall, who presided over the Supreme Court for 34 years, understood the importance of construction and expressed what he considered decisive when interpreting our laws.

“What do gentlemen mean by a ‘strict construction?’ If they contend only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle….As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction.” – Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Chief Justice Marshall, Opinion of the Court

One of the prominent justices that served alongside Chief Justice Marshall was Joseph Story. He served in the Supreme Court for over three decades and undoubtedly had a strong comprehension of American law. His view of citizenship, which is in agreement with both natural law theory and Vattel’s theories on national law, was guided by an understanding of the construction of law and a long career of judicial interpretation.

“46. First, the place of birth of a person is considered as his domicil, if it is at the time of his birth the domicil of his parents. ‘Patris originem unusquisque sequatur’. This is usually denominated the domicil of birth or nativity, domicilum originis. But, if the parents are then on a visit, or on a journey, (in itinere), the home of the parents (at least if it is in the same country) will be deemed the domicil of birth or nativity….Secondly, the domicil of birth of minors continues, until they have obtained a new domicil. Thirdly, minors are generally deemed incapable, proprio marte, of changing their domicil during their minority; and therefore, they retain the domicil of their parents; and if the parents change their domicil, that of the infant children follows it….

“48. First, persons who are born in a country, are generally deemed to be citizens and subjects of that country. A reasonable qualification of the rule would seem to be, that it should not apply to the children of parents, who were in itinere in the country, or who were abiding there for temporary purposes, as for health, or curiosity, or occasional business.” – Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (1834), Ch. III

From the early years of our republic, and even before its creation, we have a clear definition of citizenship, how it is to be applied to national government, and how those laws are to be interpreted. All of these lead us to the natural conferring of citizenship by extraction, not merely place of birth. The jus sanguinis mode of bestowing citizenship on children is proper for the form of government adopted in the United States and the laws and principles that guide it. It was precisely this understanding that led to the conflict in the 1850’s and 60’s over whether slaves and other “Negroes” were or could become citizens of the United States, and whether they could enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens.

The Supreme Court case, Scott v. Sanford, was the culmination of the flaws in judicial interpretation of constitutional law, not of the law itself. It was the understanding of the Court that the proper legal construction of our laws confirmed the denial of citizenship to such persons that led to the need for an amendment to the Constitution.

“No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day. This court was not created by the Constitution for such purposes. Higher and graver trusts have been confided to it, and it must not falter in the path of duty.” – Scott v. Sanford (1856), Chief Justice Taney, Opinion of the Court

In and of itself, this ruling is correct. The meaning of the words in the Constitution is the same no matter the time in history that it is read. But regarding “negro” citizenship, this decision was wrong.

After the Civil War and the emancipation of slaves, the debate turned to the question of citizenship for the former slaves and other black Americans. According to Supreme Court precedent, black slaves of African descent were not able to become citizens in the same respect as free people of European descent. Although they had their freedom from slavery, black Americans were not considered citizens and thus did not share the same privileges and immunities as white Americans. In order to extend them to the black population Congress had to enact a positive law that overruled the Court’s precedent and that explicitly granted citizenship to the former slaves.

In 1866, Congress did exactly that. They began crafting new laws of citizenship that would reinforce the previously held notions of citizenship based on natural law and national law principles. The results of their efforts were two similar acts of legislation: The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.

There was extensive debate in both houses of Congress before any new laws were passed. They wanted to ensure that their definition of citizenship was precise and that it would not be misunderstood. They also knew that the reason for drafting the legislation was to overturn rulings that specifically denied United States citizenship to black Americans.

After extensive research into the debates in Congress over the language of the 14th Amendment, it is clear that no perfect or comprehensive definition of citizenship was identified by the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” However, there are several distinct arguments made by the key players in the legislative process that point to a more specific interpretation of the phrase. There are also laws written and adopted before and after the amendment was ratified and there are several court dicta in the years immediately following which paint a clear picture of citizenship and the intent of the language utilized.

Prior to the 14th Amendment, the 39th Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The first clause of the Act read:

“That all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.”

The meaning of the phrase “not subject to any foreign Power” was explained by various politicians. Whether or not the new law was “declaratory,” as many assumed it to be, is beside the point – although this was also debated many times. Both sides agreed on one particular matter: Citizenship was never conferred on anyone by mere birth within the borders of the United States alone.  

“The sole purpose of the bill is to secure to that class of persons [former slaves] the fundamental rights of citizenship….

“To accomplish this great purpose, the bill declares, in the first place, that all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign Power, are citizens of the United States. Now, I do not regard that as the enunciation of any new principle. It is, in my judgment, but declaratory of the existing law. According to my apprehension, every man born in the United States, and not owing allegiance to a foreign Power, is a citizen of the United States.” – Rep. Thayer, March 2, 1866 (Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1152)

Representative Thayer makes an important distinction about citizenship and the notion of allegiance. It is not just birth within a territory that makes a citizen, but his allegiance to the laws and government of that territory.

“The American negro is civilized, and of necessity, must owe allegiance somewhere. And until the opponents of this measure can point to the foreign Power to which he is subject, the African potentate to whom after five generations of absence he still owes allegiance, I will assume him to be, what the bill calls him, a citizen of the country in which he was born.” – Rep. Broomall, March 8, 1866 (Ibid, p. 1262)

This understanding of citizenship from Representative Broomall explains that the recently freed slaves cannot possibly owe any allegiance to a “foreign Power” because they had been removed from their native country for several generations. This is a critical point to make and it adheres to the same principles that guided citizenship laws for foreign-born persons whose parents were American citizens at birth, by virtue of their parents’ citizenship, but had never resided in the United States. Their children were considered to be aliens – the American “negroes” were not, according to exactly the same principles.

Representative John Bingham, author of the 14th Amendment, had this to say about the language of the Civil Rights Act:

“I find no fault with the introductory clause, which is simply declaratory of what is written in the Constitution, that every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural-born citizen; but, sir, I may be allowed to say further, that I deny that the congress of the United States ever had the power or color of power to say that any man born within the jurisdiction of the United States, not owing a foreign allegiance, is not and shall not be a citizen of the United States.” – March 9, 1866 (Ibid, p. 1291)

Here, Representative Bingham explicitly states that the government never had the authority to deny citizenship to anyone who met the basic requirements outlined in the Civil Rights Act. The fact that a new law had to be made to reiterate the point is what led many to call the language “declaratory.” And once again, we have a knowledgeable source referring to a “natural-born citizen” and giving his interpretation of the phrase. In his opinion, all former slaves must be natural-born citizens according to his comprehension of United States law.

Just two months later, the Senate found itself debating the language of a new constitutional amendment. The 14th Amendment was intended to cement the concepts of the Civil Rights Act as part of our Constitution so that it could not be altered on the whims of a succeeding Congress. The language of this new amendment adopted a more inclusive tone, rather than exclusive. But the general meaning of the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” was no different than that of the Civil Rights Act, which was adopted by the same Congress just one month earlier.

“This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of embassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons. It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States. This has long been a great desideratum in the jurisprudence and legislation of this country.” – Senator Jacob Howard, author of the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment, May 30, 1866 (Ibid, p. 2890)

Within these statements, Senator Howard touches on several key points.

First is the distinction between “limits” and “jurisdiction.” Many have argued that “jurisdiction” refers to the geographical boundaries of the United States. This statement, as well as many others throughout our history, directly refutes that argument.

Secondly, Senator Howard refers to natural law as his origin for the meaning of the language in this amendment. Natural law theories were discussed at the beginning of this essay and it was concluded that citizenship, according to natural law theorists, was gained through extraction, not place of birth. He also mentions national law – as in, United States law – which is not the common law of England, as many have argued when promoting the idea of “birthright” citizenship from the jus soli point of view.

Thirdly, Senator Howard explicitly exempts those persons born of foreigners and aliens from gaining United States citizenship. This also follows natural law principles and is what the senator presumed to be “the law of the land already.”

These three positions, which were all “declaratory” of existing law according to Senator Howard, were established within the introductory citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment – which was authored by none other than Howard himself.

On the very same day, Senator Lyman Trumbull – chairman of the judiciary committee and framer of the 13th Amendment – had this to say about the citizenship clause:

“The provision is, that ‘all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.’ That means ‘subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof.’…What do we mean by ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?’ Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is what it means.” – Ibid, p. 2893

Here we have another reference to allegiance, just as we had with the previous Civil Rights Act. But this time the word allegiance is used in reference to the language of the new amendment in the same context as existing law. Just as Senator Howard had correctly pointed out, the introductory clause reiterated existing law – that being the Civil Rights Act.

Senator Johnson concurred with Senator Trumbull and added these statements on his own account:

“If there are to be citizens of the United States entitled everywhere to the character of citizens of the United States there should be some certain definition of what citizenship is, what has created the character of citizen as between himself and the United States, and the amendment says that citizenship may depend upon birth, and I know of no better way to give rise to citizenship than the fact of birth within the territory of the United states, born of parents who at the time were subject to the authority of the United States. I am, however, by no means prepared to say, as I think I have intimated before, that being born within the United States, independent of any new constitutional provision on the subject, creates the relation of citizen to the United States.” – Ibid, p. 2893

Again, an explanation of citizenship includes the status of the parents in the United States. Senator Johnson also makes the point to declare that he has never imagined that birth in the United States alone made one a citizen of the United States.

Senator Howard then replied to the previous statements made by Senator Trumbull.

“I think the language as it stands is sufficiently certain and exact. It is that ‘all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.’

“I concur entirely with the honorable Senator from Illinois [Trumbull], in holding that the word ‘jurisdiction,’ as here employed, ought to be construed so as to imply a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States, coextensive in all respects with the constitutional power of the United States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the judicial department; that is to say, the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now.” – Ibid, p. 2895

By declaring that “jurisdiction” applies in the same way to those who are already citizens, Senator Howard makes it clear that only those children born of citizens already can claim United States citizenship at the time of their birth. As the author of the citizenship clause, he would know best the intent that this amendment was to convey.

Finally, we have a senator who ties the Civil Rights Act directly to the 14th Amendment.

“Mr. President, the celebrated civil rights bill which has been passed during the present Congress, which was the forerunner of this constitutional amendment, and to give validity to which this constitutional amendment is brought forward, and which without this constitutional amendment to enforce it has no validity so far as this question is concerned, uses the following language:

“‘That all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.’” – Senator Doolittle, Ibid, p. 2896

The 14th Amendment was created for the purpose of making the declarations in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 enforceable by the federal government under constitutional law, which would be legally binding on all of the States. The language is slightly different, but the meaning is the same, as those who drafted and debated the amendment had made quite clear. If this connection alone was not explicit enough, the Revised Statutes of 1874, which were a codification of United States law, used the following language for citizenship:

“All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States.” – Revised Statutes, Title XXV, Section 1992

Within a few years after the ratification of the 14th Amendment, the question of citizenship was included in several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Although these remarks on citizenship were not precedents established by virtue of ruling on the specific matter itself, they are a small collection of dicta that paint a picture of the Court’s general comprehension of citizenship laws in the United States.

In 1872, the Supreme Court heard the case, Carlisle v. United States. The relevance to citizenship had to do with the allegiance of aliens living within the geographical boundaries of the United States.

“‘The rights of sovereignty extend to all persons and things not privileged that are within the territory. They extend to all strangers therein, not only to those who are naturalized and to those who are domiciled therein, having taken up their abode with the intention of permanent residence, but also to those whose residence is transitory. All strangers are under the protection of the sovereign while they are within his territories, and owe a temporary allegiance in return for that protection.’ – Wildman, Institutes on International Law (p. 40)

“By allegiance is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation or it may be a qualified and temporary one. The citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or another sovereign. The alien, whilst domiciled in the country, owes a local and temporary allegiance, which continues during the period of his residence.

“This obligation of temporary allegiance by an alien resident in a friendly country is everywhere recognized by publicists and statesmen.” – Carlisle v. United States (1872), Opinion of the Supreme Court

This opinion affirms the definition of citizenship that was enunciated in natural law theory and agrees with United States citizenship according to former Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story. It also conforms to the issue of allegiance that was discussed during debates in Congress over the previously mentioned Civil Rights Act and the 14th Amendment and identifies those who were specifically excluded from conferring citizenship onto their children.

The next year, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughterhouse Cases. Among the topics involved in the decision was citizenship.

“This decision [Dred Scott], while it met the condemnation of some of the ablest statesmen and constitutional lawyers of the country, had never been overruled, and if it was to be accepted as a constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the negro race who had recently been made freemen were still not only not citizens, but were incapable of becoming so by anything short of an amendment to the Constitution.

“To remove this difficulty primarily, and to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States and also citizenship of a State, the first clause of the first section was framed.

“The first observation we have to make on this clause is that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.” – Justice Miller, Opinion of the Supreme Court (1873)

In another extensive review of the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court issued their perspective of what citizenship laws in the United States implied. Their knowledge of the law led them to the conclusion that the 14th Amendment was written specifically to include the African race as citizens – as long as each individual met the requirements laid out in that amendment – and that persons born in the United States to citizens of another country were not citizens of the United States. In their view, the justices of the Supreme Court understood the same concept of citizenship that had been established by natural law and the laws adopted during the latter half of the previous decade.

The next case ties both of the previous dicta together and even explains the phrase “natural-born citizen.”

“Before its adoption, the Constitution of the United States did not in terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several states, yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision. There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance. 

“The Constitution does not in words say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first.” – Minor v. Happersett (1874), Opinion of the Court

Two things need to be noted here. The first is that the “common law” reference made in this opinion is actually the common law of the United States, not of England. The second is the idea that a person can be born within the jurisdiction of a state or sovereign without the parents being subject to it as well. A child cannot be born without at least a mother present. If the mother is not subject to the jurisdiction, then neither is the child. The phraseology in the opinion may simply be a misuse of language, or it is stressing the point in contention – that “there have been doubts” about whether or not citizenship can exist in such a case.

This dictum in Minor v. Happersett first addresses the fact that citizenship does exist without explicit, written laws that detail who shall be citizens. References to membership in a society and the “reciprocal obligations” of allegiance and protection are directly related to and consistent with the same natural law principles that had been guiding United States law for nearly a century.

In employing the phrase “natural-born citizen” in the second part of this dictum, the Court recognizes first that such a term is not merely an artful use of language, like many modern “scholars” have proclaimed, and second, that it has a legal meaning which had been understood for several generations. This definition of “natural-born citizen” is again explained as a person born of two citizen parents within the geographical boundaries of the country of which his parents are citizens. It is the same definition used by Vattel and adopted by our Founding Fathers and it is the same definition used by John Bingham when debating citizenship in Congress just eight years prior to this decision.

Ten years later, the Supreme Court found itself in the middle of another citizenship case. This one dealt with a Native American and whether or not he became a citizen by merely leaving his tribal jurisdiction and residing within the limits of United States territory. The 14th Amendment was once again the reference point for making that determination.

“This section contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.’ The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired.” – Elk v. Wilkins (1884), Justice Gray, Opinion of the Supreme Court

Justice Gray makes the correct distinction that “political jurisdiction” is part of the broad-spectrum “jurisdiction” adopted in the 14th Amendment. Citizens of the United States are entitled to legislative representation, while foreigners and aliens are not. If we are to understand that citizens are members of our society, then these members have a right to representation according to our Constitution. If a person has no right to representation in our legislative branch of government, then it can be reasonably assumed that such a person has no right to exercise the privileges that come with that representation, and is therefore not a citizen. If they are not citizens in accordance with the most remedial principles of our government, then they have no right to pass on citizenship to their children.

Being subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States is a key element of membership, or citizenship, in our society. Without political rights, which include protection from our government when traveling abroad and participation in the legislative process, citizenship is essentially meaningless. Anyone not entitled to those political rights can accurately be described as a non-citizen. Consequently, these persons are rightfully and legally understood to be foreigners or aliens whose children have no claim to citizenship in the United States according to our laws.

Thomas Cooley illustrated the types of privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens in a publication from 1880.

“A citizen of the United States as such has a right to participate in foreign and interstate commerce, to have the benefit of the postal laws, to make use in common with others of the navigable waters of the United States, and to pass from State to State and into foreign countries, because over all these subjects the jurisdiction of the United States extends, and they are covered by its laws. These, therefore, are among the privileges of citizens of the United States. So every citizen may petition the Federal authorities which are set over him in respect to any matter of public concern; may examine the public records of the Federal jurisdiction; may visit the seat of government without being subjected to the payment of a tax for the privilege; may be purchaser of the public lands on the same terms with others; may participate in the government if he comes within the conditions of suffrage; and may demand the care and protection of the United States when on the high seas, or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. The privileges suggest the immunities. Wherever it is the duty of the United State to give protection to a citizen against any harm, inconvenience, or deprivation, the citizen is entitled to an immunity which pertains to Federal citizenship.” – The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America, Chapter XIV, Section I

Cooley’s “abridgment” lays out some of the fundamental benefits of citizenship. Non-citizens are not entitled to any of these as citizens are and may only engage in those acts with explicit permission by the government or according to laws that extend those privileges specifically to non-citizens. Foreigners and aliens are certainly not able to participate in the federal government or demand protection from it when traveling abroad, as those are rights exclusively reserved to citizens.

As obvious as the previous statements may be, it is likewise evident that these non-citizens cannot bear children who are then entitled to the privileges of citizens at birth.

In 1885, Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard wrote a letter to Boyd Winchester, a minister to Switzerland, regarding the citizenship of Richard Greisser, who was born in the United States to a German father and citizen of Germany. Under Section 1992 of the Revised Statutes and according to the language of the 14th Amendment, Secretary Bayard concluded that Greisser’s father was not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. As a result, it was decided that Greisser himself was not a citizen of the United States.

This judgment is in concurrence with all of the laws and opinions previously cited. The sum of all of these conclusions is in harmony with the original principles of natural law theory and the form of government established by our founding generation.

As a result of our written laws, the United States does not officially recognize dual citizenship. The reasons are found in the principles of natural law and the concept of national sovereignty. Since our founding, immigrants to the United States have been required to take an oath to “absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which [they] have heretofore been a subject or citizen.” This is part of the oath as it is currently written today.

Denying the notion of dual citizenship conforms to the accepted practice of expatriation and of avoiding conflicting international obligations. As a matter of national sovereignty, the United States accepts that their laws on who will be admitted as citizens supersede the laws of any other nation. It is our inherent right to accept as citizens whomever we choose and to stipulate whatever conditions are to be met when citizenship is granted. If an individual chooses to renounce their former citizenship and become a citizen of the United States, they have the full right to do so according to our national laws. If that conflicts with the laws of other nations, then that is a conflict to be settled by those nations, not by the United States.

No person can owe a permanent allegiance to two competing sovereigns or states. Yet, by accepting dual citizenship, the government that recognizes it claims that such an allegiance can exist. The argument is made that this permanent allegiance depends on where the individual temporarily resides – whether he is in his country of origin, or in his newly adopted one. But this argument defies all logic. How can one owe a permanent allegiance temporarily? This absurdity is what has lead many to call dual citizenship a “fiction of law.”

The concept of dual citizenship is the direct result of flawed reasoning which begets inconsistent laws. Natural law theory avoids conflicts between sovereign nations by adhering to the jus sanguinis model of citizenship. Combined with the right of expatriation, any potential problems are resolved by natural rights inherent in each individual. If one can renounce their former citizenship and confer their new citizenship onto their children, then there can be no conflict of laws that would create a dual citizen. Each individual would be born to persons who have acquired the citizenship of their choice and their citizenship would then become that of the child at birth in all circumstances.

Unfortunately, not all countries adopt this form of citizenship. But it is clear that the United States did.

As previously discussed, the United States has always recognized the right of expatriation. And according to our early naturalization laws, the transfer of citizenship depended not on the place of birth, but the citizenship of the parents.

“And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States.” – Naturalization Act of 1790

The natural transfer of citizenship from parent to child was reiterated in each subsequent naturalization act. Each of these acts confirmed that children born of United States citizens outside the geographical limits and political jurisdiction of this country were to be citizens of the United States at birth. In addition, there were no provisions in any of these acts that acknowledged children born of yet to be naturalized foreigners as citizens of the United States. The children were explicitly admitted to citizenship once the parents acquired it and only if the child was under the age of twenty-one.

Behind these acts lies the basis for making the previous terms explicit. It is explained succinctly by George Yeaman.

“By permanently settling in another country and adopting the forms prescribed by its laws, the immigrant either becomes a citizen of that country or he does not. If he does he is a citizen without qualification, as to other nations, both in his duties and in his rights, and is entitled to the full benefit of the protecting arm of the Government. If he does not thus become a citizen, he remains a subject or citizen, though residing in a foreign land, of the country of his birth, the Government of his native allegiance. He cannot owe allegiance to both.” – Allegiance and Citizenship, p. 19

If one does not become a citizen of the country in which they reside, then their children acquire the same citizenship as the parents’ country of origin. If they become citizens of their adopted country, then so do their children at birth, or at the time of their naturalization. These principles are grounded in reason and are consistent with natural law and the adopted laws of our founding generation and several generations thereafter.

By adopting our citizenship laws as they were written, our government made dual citizenship unattainable in theory, but not in fact. The laws of foreign countries could always be in conflict with our laws, but in regards to United States citizenship, they were irrelevant.

What we currently refer to as “birthright” citizenship and dual citizenship are mockeries of the principles of national sovereignty, national law, and the liberty on which this country was founded. These mockeries began with the Supreme Court precedent established in United States v. Wong Kim Ark in 1898.

In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the child of a foreign citizen born in the United States became a citizen at birth according to the 14th Amendment’s citizenship clause. The Court also ruled that the United States government’s treaty with China, which barred Chinese workers from acquiring United States citizenship, was essentially inconsequential. Not only did this ruling defy all national laws of citizenship up to that point, but it also rendered an international treaty, agreed to by the consent of two sovereign nations, null and void.

Since this travesty of our national law became precedent, it has not been overruled. The precedent still remains in force today despite the fact that the language of our laws is mostly identical to the laws that were originally adopted. The 14th Amendment has never been repealed. Article II, Section I of the Constitution has never been amended or abolished. The definition of natural-born citizenship has not changed and the basic requirements for United States citizenship have not been altered by the written law.

“The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:

“(a)  a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof;” – U.S. Code: Title 8, Ch. 12, § 1401

This is the exact same language used in the 14th Amendment which was explained by its author as meaning “full and complete jurisdiction…the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now.” This meaning does not equate to conferring citizenship on the children of foreigners or aliens and it is wholly incompatible with the established precedent by the Supreme Court. The Court’s precedent is a farce that has been perpetrated on this country for far too long.

Dual citizenship is a direct consequence of this legal misinterpretation and the misunderstanding of natural law principles. In the first instance, children born of foreigners in this country would otherwise not be citizens of the United States, if not for the precedent established by the Supreme Court. In the latter case, if we had a firm grasp of the natural law theories that guided our founding generation, we could easily identify the errors of allowing foreigners to retain their former citizenship status from their country of origin.

There are many competing viewpoints of citizenship in the United States, but most of them are not consistent with the constitutional principles upon which this country was founded. Only children born to United States citizens – whether their parents were natural born or naturalized – are citizens of the United States at birth, according to law.

Our government is failing to properly correct or even address the issue today. In order to reverse a century of erroneously granting citizenship to the children of foreigners or aliens, it would appear that there must be either a new Supreme Court ruling to overturn the Wong Kim Ark precedent, or Congress must adopt a new law that overrules the Court’s decision – just as the federal legislature had acted to cancel out the precedent established in the Dred Scott case.

As long as citizenship continues to be guided by flawed reasoning and contradictory court precedents, it will continue to erode the underpinnings of this nation. The United States needs to return to the foundation of citizenship that was articulately established by the natural law theorists many generations ago and adopted by the enlightened philosophers and statesmen that formed our new government.

 

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